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ABSTRACT: This article examines the impact of interregionalism on deepening regional 
integration processes in non-European Union (EU) regions, specifically the Southern 
Common Market (Mercosur). It considers whether ‘capacity building’ functions of 
interregionalism are present in EU-Mercosur relations. It argues that although negotiations 
for an association agreement might have helped Mercosur survive periods of severe crisis in 
the past, the terms of the agreement under negotiation were not sufficiently attractive to 
encourage deeper integration in Mercosur. Moreover, interregionalism cannot be expected to 
compensate for low institutionalisation nor substitute for weak political willingness to deepen 
integration.  Ultimately, Mercosur alone can decide how far it wants to take its regional 
integration.  







Recent research in international relations acknowledges the relevance of interregionalism as a 
distinct level of international interaction in the hierarchy of global governance. Interest in this 
phenomenon especially grew in the 1990s, when the European Union (EU) put promoting 
interregional dialogue at the forefront of its global actor strategy. Moreover, 
interregionalism’s salience increased with escalating policy interest in using it as a base for 
building multilevel governance structures under globalisation, specifically at a time when the 
international system seemed to be moving beyond the Westphalian pattern of state-to-state 
interaction. Given its potential utility to global governance, it is worth understanding whether 
interregionalism could actually speed up the formation and consolidation of the structures on 
which it rests, i.e. closer integration within regional organisations. Theoretical analyses 
(Hänggi, Roloff and Rüland 2006; Gilson 2002) accept that regional entities may interact to 
give rise to interregionalism. However, it is unclear whether the reverse sequence/logic can 
operate effectively.  Hence, there is theoretical as well as empirical value in better 
understanding the impact of interregionalism on regional integration, specifically whether 
‘engaging in interregionalism creates a need for regions to consolidate’ (Söderbaum, 
Stahlgren and Langenhove 2005:379). It also merits noting that theoretically the impact of 
interregionalism could occur both during negotiations for a formal interregional agreement 
and/or after implementation of such an agreement.  
While much has been written about whether and how non-EU regions respond to ideas of 
regional integration per se, less has been published on whether these regions benefit from 
engaging in interregionalism. Few empirical studies are available on the potential impacts of 
interregionalism on regional integration from the point of view of non-EU regionalism 
projects, especially those in developing countries.1 Given stagnation at the multilateral level, 
especially the Doha Round of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the limited spheres 
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of action of plurilateral groupings such as the G20, regionalism is again being seen as a 
means of easing the process of decision-making for global governance.  
Given the above gaps in the literature and the renewed interest in these processes, this article 
examines the following main research question: Why and in what ways has engaging in 
interregionalism with the EU been relevant for regional integration in the Southern Common 
Market (Mercosur)? It also considers whether external incentives can counterbalance internal 
obstacles to deeper regional integration. More broadly, the article aims to contribute to 
understanding how interregionalism can act as an instrument to support and encourage 
regional integration in non-EU regions, and whether it can provide a counter-balance to the 
preference for inter-governmentalism. The research is based on the analysis of official 
documents and statements as well as interviews with key officials and advisors close to 
interregional negotiations. Interviews were mainly conducted in 2008 and 2010.2  
Research provided three insights specific to EU-Mercosur interregionalism. First, whatever 
the outcome of the negotiations for an EU-Mercosur Association Agreement, the 
interregional negotiating process itself contributed to Mercosur members’ interest in keeping 
the regional project alive even under very difficult conditions and possibly nudged them 
towards taking more practical steps to integration. Second, the rewards and opportunities on 
offer via interregionalism were too meagre for Mercosur governments to willingly sacrifice 
decision-making autonomy to regional institutions. Third, deepening Mercosur integration 
need not be a condition for moving forward with signing an interregional agreement with the 
EU, but rather Mercosur should be left to find its own path to regional integration.  
The article develops these arguments in four sections: (i) theoretical framework examining 
the functions of inter-regionalism; (ii) the EU’s role in promoting interregionalism; (iii) 
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interregionalism and Mercosur integration; and (iv) implications of the tensions between 
Mercosur’s internal and external agendas (i.e. regionalism and interregionalism respectively).  
FUNCTIONS OF INTERREGIONALISM 
Interregionalism may be simply defined as the condition or process whereby two regions 
interact as regions (Söderbaum and Langenhove 2005:257). This does not imply that each 
region has the same level of integration, but some minimal threshold of regional integration 
must have been achieved in each region for these interactions to be coherent and meaningful 
in terms of decision-making and implementation of agreements.  
Theoretically, the research starting point was the academic literature focused on the 
phenomenon of interregionalism. This literature attributes five main functions to 
interregionalism. These are balancing, rationalizing, agenda-setting, institution building, and 
collective identity formation (Doidge 2007; Hänggi 2003; Rüland 2010). The first three 
functions are externally focused and refer to how interregionalism operates upwards to the 
multilateral level, what Doidge (2007) calls a ‘globally active’ type of interregionalism. The 
latter two functions of interregionalism are mainly internally focused (although they could 
also have an external dimension) and operate downwards to the regional level, what Doidge 
calls a ‘capacity building’ type of interregionalism. Implicitly, this suggests that the latter 
‘capacity building’ type serves to create conditions for the former ‘globally active’ type to 
operate efficiently.  
It can be argued that the growing frustration with the ineffectiveness and lack of progress in 
multilateral governance talks as well as a perceived leadership vacuum at the global level has 
reinforced the importance of geography. Regional organisations could be seen as a first step 
towards creating broader multi-state governance structures to address the many cross-border 
challenges facing the international system. In a second step, two strong regionalisms might 
5 
 
actively collaborate at the multilateral level to improve balancing, rationalising and agenda-
setting (Rüland 2010). However, where there are substantial differences in the level of 
regional integration, the ‘capacity building’ type of interregionalism is likely to dominate 
(Doidge 2007). Moreover, these authors argue that if well integrated regions act more 
coherently on the global stage, then it is in the self-interest of advanced regions to encourage 
integration in other regions. Unsurprisingly, the EU often plays the role of the ‘external 
federator’, although receptivity to its coaxing depends on a number of factors. So, under what 
conditions can interregionalism reinforce a region’s implicit or explicit moves towards deeper 
integration? What are the instruments available to support and encourage this process? The 
article answers these questions with reference to the case of Mercosur.  
Since the EU and Mercosur exhibit disparate levels of regional integration, the literature 
suggests that a ‘capacity building’ type of interregionalism focused on institution building is 
more likely to be the significant factor in their relations. The EU has numerous instruments to 
build institutional capacities for integration among its partners, mainly by engaging in an 
interregional dialogue that provides technical training, administrative knowhow, and financial 
assistance. They also might hold out enticements, such as a preferential trade agreement 
(PTA) or strategic partnership, to encourage the weaker regional group to embrace stronger 
regional commitments. The less cohesive region could respond by imitating the integrative 
behaviour and institutional structure of the more advanced regional grouping. It also might 
find itself forced to act collectively to get its voice heard above a more integrated ‘other’ 
(Doidge 2007:239).  
In case of the collective identity formation function, interregional dialogue may encourage 
the development of a more emphatic regional identity among the actors involved in the 
process. This refers to both state actors and civil society/citizens. Needless to say, this could 
be a long drawn out process, heavily dependent on political developments, levels of trust as 
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well as the nature of societal interests, preferences and engagement. More practical benefits 
(and costs) are also likely to shape the incentives to collaborate.  
A regional identity could form indirectly by requiring regions to establish a consensus on 
negotiating agendas (as a minimum) to allow for coherent group positions in the interregional 
talks. This process may also remind the relevant actors that they share common values, norms 
and characteristics in contrast to the ‘other’ (as a maximum). The gradual emergence of a 
stronger regional identity and recognition of shared interests and values in turn could lead to 
firmer rules for regional cooperation and integration. Thus, confronted with a cohesive EU, 
less integrated regions are encouraged to develop a more coherent regional identity (as 
evident in Asia’s response to interaction with the EU). Ironically, the shared interests and 
values highlighted via this interaction might actually be inimical to EU preferences, 
especially trade liberalisation (as evident in Mercosur). Thus, the above two functions 
together address the role of institutions and actors respectively. Jointly, they could cultivate 
among less advanced regional groupings a greater support for their own regionalism projects. 
A final point relates to the nature of regional organisation and decision-making, specifically 
the extent to which inter-governmentalism rather than supra-nationalism shapes policy-
making in the regional integration process. Typically, only in more advanced regionalism 
projects, such as the EU, have member states shown an inclination to cede or share 
sovereignty in an expanding set of issue areas.3 Finally, it is not just the nature of regional 
institutions that matters. Rather, the capacity of regional actors and their willingness to 
actually implement agreements (especially in the absence of supra-national institutions) that 
really matters for successful integration.  Before examining Mercosur regionalism, it is 
relevant to note some key points related to the EU’s role in promoting regional integration.  
THE EU’S ROLE PROMOTING INTERREGIONALISM 
7 
 
Academics working in the liberal-idealist tradition have espoused the notion of the EU as a 
‘normative’ and ‘civilian’ power with a civilising mission in international politics (Manners 
2002). It is often argued that the EU displays a distinctive approach to international relations 
which emphasises ‘soft power’ and uses diplomacy, persuasion and negotiation to influence 
outcomes. Nowhere is this more evident than in the considerable effort the EU makes 
towards encouraging regionalism, often via some form of ‘reinforcement by support’ 
(Jetschke and Lenz 2013).   
The academic literature gives several explanations for the EU’s active engagement in 
interregional processes (Söderbaum et. al. 2005; Hänggi 2003; Rüland 2010). These studies 
note that interregionalism is expected to promote the EU’s power and competitiveness, and 
also to build its identity as a global actor. Interregionalism is a means of enhancing material 
conditions as well as the EU’s ‘normative power’. There is much evidence that the European 
Commission (EC) as well as European Council of Ministers aimed to promote a liberal 
internationalist agenda supporting democracy and good governance, respect for human rights, 
social inclusiveness, socio-economic development, etc.4 Furthermore, EU institutions set out 
to encourage mimetic behaviour in other regional groupings and often provided support to 
those receptive to the ‘EU model’.  
The EU’s interregionalism strategy led to the development of a hub and spoke pattern of 
interregional dialogues with Asia, Africa, and Latin America by the mid 1990s. Some authors 
credit the EC with developing the concept of interregionalism (Hardacre 2010; Hardacre and 
Smith 2011). Moreover, differentiated contexts and local circumstances ensured regionalism 
did not lead to identical patterns of integration nor identikit regional organisations. Jetschke 
and Lenz (2013:6) discuss how mechanisms of diffusion (such as competition, learning and 
emulation), often emanating from the pioneering EU, impacted institutional development of 
regional organisations. The success of the EU as ‘external federator’ depended on numerous 
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factors in the less integrated region, such as political and social context, institutional 
characteristics and capabilities,  and expected rewards from closer relations with the EU. 
(Hardacre and Smith 2011). For example, García (2012) shows how the EU’s ‘penchant for 
interregionalism’ and its ‘transformative power’ had only a limited impact in Latin America.  
Significantly, the EU itself lacked a single coherent strategy. Some members, such as the 
United Kingdom, France and Spain, saw interregionalism as a means to maintain ties with 
their ex-colonies. Other members, such as those joining in the recent eastward expansion of 
the EU, often saw developing regions as rivals in trade and investment. One can also point to 
the difficulty of developing pan European strategies that meaningfully replace national ones 
in its interregional relations (Messner 2007). The differences between Commission and 
Council positions were also very obvious, and even the EC itself did not have a monolithic 
position. The different directorate-generals (DGs) had varying preferences and positions were 
often defined by the DG that took the lead in interregional negotiations (e.g. DG Trade, DG 
External Relations and DG Agriculture and Rural Development had divergent positions on 
Mercosur).  
The EU’s position on interregionalism also was impacted by internal institutional changes, 
mainly after the Lisbon Treaty came into force in 2009. The post-Lisbon inter-institutional 
arrangements and relations between the Commission, President of the European Council, the 
European High Representative and newly created European External Assistance Service as 
well as the new powers of the European Parliament introduced many changes in the possible 
outcomes of interregional negotiations. It is still unclear how these shifts will impact the 
balance between material gains and normative values in EU external relations. The big 
questions from the point of view of this study are: Does the EU’s toning down of the 
normative aspects in its external relations and lessened focus on using interregionalism to 
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shape global governance mechanisms mean that regional integration elsewhere will lose 
momentum? Will its own internal crises put interregionalism on the policy back-burner?   
Finally, one cannot ignore the completely changed scenario within which interregionalism 
negotiations feature. The long years of stagnation at the Doha Round in combination with the 
on-going economic crisis and high levels of unemployment in many EU countries has put 
huge pressure on EC negotiators. The normative content of interregionalism is not really a 
priority any longer; instead attention has turned to negotiating agreements with very large 
economies, such as the United States and Japan (Messerlin 2013). Another crucial shift has 
been the decision of the EU to emphasise hybrid interregional relationships, where it enters 
into a strategic partnership with a key member of a regional bloc (e.g. Brazil in Mercosur’s 
case). This not only complicates interregional arrangements, but also has the potential to 
create distrust within the region (actually going counter to the EU’s stated objectives for the 
region).  
INTERREGIONAL NEGOTIATIONS AND MERCOSUR INTEGRATION  
The theoretical framework outlined how a ‘capacity building’ type of interregionalism 
focused on enhancing the weaker region’s integration internally often implied a focus on the 
institution building and/or collective identity formation functions of interregionalism. EU-
Mercosur negotiations for an association agreement serve as an interesting test of both the 
theoretical argument and the practical implications of the EU’s preferences and actions for 
Mercosur regionalism.  
EU-Mercosur negotiations occurred in two phases, with a hiatus between them when 
negotiations were abandoned between 2004 and 2010. The first phase began when the two 
regions signed the EU-Mercosur Interregional Framework Cooperative Agreement in 1995. 
The intention was to negotiate a comprehensive and substantive interregional agreement 
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involving the three pillars of political dialogue, economic cooperation and a preferential trade 
agreement. After much dithering, the European Council of Ministers gave the EC go-ahead to 
begin trade negotiations in 1999, just as a four-year period of deep crisis and instability hit 
Mercosur economies.5 Unsurprisingly, the trade component of the talks caused the most 
trouble, mainly due to political sensitivities caused by strong opposition lobbying in both 
regions (defensive positions mainly originated in manufactured goods and services in 
Mercosur and in agriculture in the EU).  By 2004, negotiations were abandoned.  
This first phase saw an EU eager to establish its credentials as an international actor, 
especially as a ‘normative power’. It actively sought to export the EU ‘model’ with its 
regulatory norms, governance mechanisms, social inclusiveness, and ‘community values’ 
(Rüland 2010). Mercosur was considered an easy target for these efforts, since there was a 
strong (and over-simplified) assumption in Brussels that Mercosur elites shared the same 
cultural codes and political objectives as their European counterparts (Grugel 2007). 
Moreover, as Grugel (2007:59) argues, there was ‘a kind of mimetic agreement’ where 
negotiators were willing to endorse EU norms and values as part of a multifaceted package 
that included greater market access.   
Mercosur was mainly interested in learning from the EU experience and benefitting from EU 
assistance on the technical and administrative aspects of creating a customs union and 
common market. An analysis of EU documents demonstrated the importance given to values, 
but also a desire to emphasise the benefits of win-win cooperation possible in interregional 
arrangements (e.g. see the Commission’s Mercosur Regional Strategy Paper, 2007). The EU 
was also concerned about losing out to growing US influence in Latin America. Although 
some elements of using interregionalism to ‘balance’ (against the US specifically) might have 
been present on both sides in this first phase, the discourse of key state actors explicitly and 
repeatedly referenced ‘capacity building’ aspects. This ranged from technical 
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assistance/knowledge transfer to mentioning normative aspects in the various documents and 
public statements of officials.  
The second phase of negotiations was announced at the margins of the EU-Latin America 
Summit held in Madrid in May 2010. The political motivations of each region’s pro tempore 
president (Spain and Argentina) were central to their revival. The mood and objectives were 
in stark contrast to those at the time of the initial launch in the 1990s. Stagnation at the 
multilateral level and abandonment of the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) altered 
negotiators’ attitudes towards interregionalism. However, there was little material change in 
positions related to the trade aspects of the previous stalemate. If anything, protectionist 
tendencies were more entrenched. On the South American side, a more political (and 
politicised) concept of regional integration had embedded itself within organisations such as 
the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (ALBA), Community of Latin American and 
Caribbean States (CELAC) and Union of South American Nations (UNASUR). Riggirozzi 
and Tussie (2012) aptly describe this as ‘post-hegemonic regionalism’, where trade and 
economic cooperation were not as central to regional integration as in the previous decade. 
On the European side, opposition to agricultural trade liberalisation was increasingly fierce. 
Members of the European Parliament from some ten countries responded to pressure from 
their farm lobbies to issue strong statements opposing any agreement that would substantially 
liberalise agricultural trade with Mercosur. They argued that Mercosur protectionism had also 
seen few improvements in recent years (e.g. see the EC’s Trade and Investment Barriers 
Report 2011).6  
The global financial crisis in 2008 considerably altered negotiators’ calculations and 
strategies. Initially, Mercosur economies emerged from the crisis in reasonably good shape. 
A quickly rising Brazil made Mercosur an attractive market for EU businesses facing gloomy 
prospects in their home markets. However, Mercosur growth lost momentum after 2012. 
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Meanwhile, the euro-zone crisis focused EU policy-makers’ attentions on monetary, fiscal 
and employment policies, leaving trade on the sidelines. The EC turned to the possibilities of 
signing ‘mega PTAs’ with ‘very large, well regulated and well connected’ economies 
(Messerlin 2013:2) – in other words, not Mercosur. 
After examining statements made by political leaders and EC officials at the time of the re-
launch and interviewing Mercosur trade negotiators in late 2010, I found no evidence that 
regional ‘capacity building’ arguments had in any way motivated a return to the negotiating 
table. Critics even dismissed the re-launch of talks as a political stunt and/or photo 
opportunity. I would argue that changed economic realities, such as the growing 
competitiveness threat from China, re-focused the attention of policy-makers on both sides. 
In many ways, the post 2008 conjuncture changed the game. While the rhetorical 
commitment to supporting regional integration and free trade remained, more practical 
actions indicated a preference for maintaining high non-tariff barriers to protect EU 
agriculture and considerable inflexibility in accommodating the less developed region’s 
demands (Söderbaum et. al. 2005:375).  
Face-to-face interviews and email exchanges with a number of interviewees in 2008 showed 
a high level of consensus on the issue of Mercosur deepening. They all agreed it was not (and 
should not be) a necessary condition for the EU to go forward with negotiations for an 
interregional association agreement. Some argued that Mercosur could learn from the EU’s 
experience, but others believed it better for the EU to allow Mercosur to find its own path to 
integration. One interviewee noted that interregional negotiations were a distraction, and 
actually detracted from deepening integration. Moreover, both Mercosur and the EU faced 
various internal problems and inconsistencies, and it was better that they focused on these 
before engaging in interregional negotiations. For example, the EU’s Common Agricultural 
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Policy was closely linked to the difficulties long evident in EU-Mercosur trade negotiations, 
while an incomplete customs union was a notable barrier on Mercosur’s side.   
Interestingly, from the point of view of this analysis, trade facilitation was one of the few 
institutional issues on which Mercosur made some progress, partly in response to pressure 
from the EU. In the wake of the re-launch of interregional negotiations in May 2010, the 
Mercosur San Juan Summit in August 2010 announced that it had agreed a common customs 
code and the end of double incidence of tariffs on goods crossing intra-regional borders. 
Significantly, in policy output terms, it is an excellent demonstration of interregionalism’s 
potential for supporting institutional capacity building. Another case of deepening regional 
institutions is the shifting stance on legalising dispute resolution, where the EU was seen as a 
role model, at least for Mercosur’s smaller states (Arnold and Rittberger 2013:122).  
Interviewees were relatively pessimistic about the prospects of an association agreement 
boosting intra-regional integration. Negotiating with the EU had forced some very divisive 
issues (e.g. industrial policy) onto the Mercosur internal agenda. They raised tensions that 
could seriously damage regional integration.7 For example, in the early months of 2014, 
Brazil and Uruguay indicated their willingness to accept a Mercosur at ‘two speeds’, where 
they would sign a more ambitious trade agreement with the EU leaving Argentina (and 
possibly Paraguay) to catch up at a later date. Given the economic situation and policy 
attitudes on both sides, some interviewees thought that any agreement was likely to have 
symbolic value at best, and unlikely to make a meaningful difference to the evolution of 
Mercosur integration.  
In 2010, interviews with top officials and business representatives in Argentina and Brazil 
evidenced a lack of conviction (and enthusiasm) for both regionalism and interregionalism. 
They noted that domestic political and economic conjunctures, especially in Argentina, were 
14 
 
not favourable to liberalisation commitments. Equally, mounting domestic woes and electoral 
consideration in European nations were inimical to softening positions on agricultural trade. 
Interestingly, by 2014, Brazilian economic elites were so frustrated with economic stagnation 
that even reluctant liberalisers began demanding the government sign PTAs with major trade 
partners.   
Some authors (e.g. Robles 2008) argue that positive impacts cannot be expected in the 
context of asymmetrical interregional dialogue in an essentially realist inspired hegemonic 
project. Undeniably, EU negotiators have been rather parsimonious in their offers. Thus, my 
research found the benefits from interregionalism would depend on who took the lead on 
finalising an agreement especially on the European side. Söderbaum, Stählgren and 
Langenhove (2005:375), although with a theoretical position that differed from Robles, also 
argue that interregional relations are normally built on the interests of the stronger region. 
Finally, it is worth reiterating that the EU is not a single actor, and its organs often have 
divergent preferences. The final agreement would reflect the level of influence of each 
directorate in the EC. And this is before even considering the additional influence of the 
European Parliament, which now has the right to ratify (or veto) any such agreement. The use 
of its veto is no idle threat as evident from statements made by some members of the 
European Parliament in support of the farm lobby when negotiations were re-launched in 
2010.  
Thus, the theoretical opportunity for interregionalism to support building regional capacity 
and institutions is dependent on the flexibility of the more advanced region’s stance in 
negotiating the agreement and on the nature of the actual agreement signed. Specifically, in 
this case, the EU could initially have focused on enhancing the elements of political dialogue 
and economic cooperation rather than getting bogged down in trade negotiations. It also 
could have considered offering trade preferences and/or evolutionary clauses that made an 
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early signing of the agreement more attractive to Mercosur. Europeans in favour of an 
agreement note that a substantive agreement with more elements of compromise on the 
agriculture question might serve as a carrot encouraging Mercosur negotiators to liberalise 
trade in manufactured goods. This could create a win-win situation, i.e. a better integrated 
Mercosur as trade and investment partner could benefit Europe overall in terms of supporting 
much needed EU jobs as well as boosting trade and growth.   
Another path to building support for Mercosur regionalism and an interregional agreement 
could have focused on developing links in civil society. Interestingly, in recent years, civil 
society actors have been at the forefront of supporting deeper integration as well as signing 
an interregional agreement.  For example, Brazilian business elites strongly criticised the 
economic paralysis of Mercosur and the Brazilian government’s failure to sign PTAs, 
including with the EU. Grugel (2007) has made a similar argument with respect to 
democratic consolidation and social citizenship. Her research indicated better results when 
the EU supported civil society actors directly rather than via dialogue and knowledge transfer 
through state actors.    
Finally, the global context has changed considerably with implications for the objectives of 
an interregional agreement. For example, Mercosur, not only faces real challenges in terms of 
its institutions, legitimacy and identity, but also needs to come to grips with issues related to 
energy and food security, global environmental and climate change, shifts in the global power 
structure, and the overall governance of these increasingly inter-locking policy areas. In this 
context, a consistent and coherent integration agenda could contribute towards building a 
strong regional institutional base to support creation of multi-level governance structures that 
can effectively address these issues.8 Steps in this direction would actually contribute to a 
‘globally active’ type of interregionalism rather than simply building intra-regional 
institutional capacity. Crucially, the EU faces similar challenges in these issue areas. The 
16 
 
joint mechanisms developed to address them could eventually provide genuine support for 
Mercosur’s further integration.  
TENSIONS IN MERCOSUR’S INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL AGENDAS 
The interregional negotiation process forms one of the central elements of Mercosur’s 
external agenda. The problems arising from internal crises and integration deficits form part 
of Mercosur’s internal agenda (Doctor 2013). This section examines whether pressures 
arising from Mercosur’s external agenda have impacted the region’s internal agenda, 
effectively answering the main research question. The theoretical literature argues that the 
external agenda should provide enough impetus to encourage Mercosur to resolve the 
problems highlighted in the internal agenda. In other words, the gains from interregionalism 
should be sufficient to tempt a region into a deeper and more institutionalised integration. 
However, whether interregionalism is a sufficient lure for Mercosur depends not only on 
what is on offer. It also depends on internal (often political) constraints as well as those 
arising from the region’s links to the global economy. Clearly, Mercosur actions can directly 
resolve some of the constraints that hamper finalising an interregional agreement (e.g. 
developing a shared vision for integration into the global economy; harmonising 
macroeconomic policies; completing the customs union; agreeing regional parameters for 
industrial policy), but others lie outside the direct control of Mercosur (e.g. EU and US trade 
policy priorities and negotiating strategies as well as their shifting interest towards Asian 
markets; slow progress in multi-lateral trade negotiations).  
The question of whether Mercosur’s internal and external agendas reinforce each other is 
extensively debated in academic as well as policy circles. Some argue that the external 
agenda (especially negotiations with the EU) provides the ‘glue’ to hold the project together 
(Phillips 2003). A twist on this argument is that the potential benefits from signing an 
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interregional agreement with the EU could actually be harnessed to serve as an impetus for 
consolidating Mercosur (Rios and Doctor 2004; Santander 2005). The latter version of the 
argument lies at the heart of the research question. Economic policy-makers often argued the 
opposite, that is, Mercosur’s external agenda actually generates additional conflicts and 
exposes divergences in the national priorities of its members. In this view, interregionalism is 
more hindrance than help. A third view argues that the stalling of the internal agenda became 
the main obstacle to progress on the external (Carranza 2006). Thus, the sequence in which a 
policy agenda is dealt with matters for outcomes. Is there evidence to support these views in 
the evolution of Mercosur integration?   
In the first view, the process of engagement with external negotiations was crucial to 
understanding the continuing survival of Mercosur. Thus, it weathered the storms of the late 
1990s by re-launching and redefining the project as a political platform for attaining shared 
external objectives. By having an external focus, where bargaining as a bloc made sense and 
improved the prospects for influencing outcomes, Mercosur’s external negotiations provided 
an arena where some progress was possible. For example, the external agenda with the EU 
linked closely with discussing the normative aspects of the regionalism agenda (democracy 
and social inclusion) and it is here that the ‘glue’ was most effective. Thus, the external 
agenda provided areas where members could agree. It allowed them to hone in on common 
concerns, interests and values, and thus helped keep (and still is keeping) Mercosur alive. The 
EU’s insistence on negotiating with Mercosur as a bloc provided a vital focus and an indirect 
means of holding the partners together in the midst of its deepest crisis (1999-2002), although 
the more pessimistic would say that it only contributed to its ‘inertial survival’ as discussed in 
Gomez-Mera (2013). This view directly coincides with Doidge’s ‘capacity building’ type and 
Rüland’s ‘institution building’ function of interregionalism.  
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In the extended version of this argument, the potential substantive gains9 from finalising 
interregional negotiations were a carrot for deepening the intra-regional integration agenda. 
This argument provided empirical support for the theoretical functions of interregionalism 
discussed by authors such as Doidge, Hänggi and Rüland, especially when they refer to its 
internal and downward operating aspects in terms of institution building and collective 
identity formation. In some ways, the ‘carrot’ version complemented the ‘glue’ version of the 
argument. Both saw the inter-locking of the internal and external agendas as a positive force 
and emphasised the substantive outcomes as a motivation for moving forward at regional and 
interregional levels. This reasoning was highlighted under so-called progressive governments 
elected into office in the early 2000s. They preferred to neglect the neo-liberal connotations 
of open regionalism, instead focusing on political dialogue and ideological affinities to 
deepen regional relations (Tussie 2009). In practical terms, this implied that the anticipated 
benefits from the reform ‘lock-in’ aspect of integration had now shifted from the intra-
regional to the interregional level. Thus, it was interregionalism that now could be expected 
not only to increase trade flows, but also to result in more investment, better and credible 
regulatory regimes, and improved systemic competitiveness (Doctor 2007).  
Given that the bigger members insisted on adhering strictly to inter-governmentalism in 
regional arrangements, smaller members believed interregionalism could ameliorate the 
impact of power asymmetries within the bloc. In the absence of greater institutionalisation 
within the region in the first instance, international agreements might provide the legal 
assurances as well as political resolve for policy-makers to sustain integration. The political 
logic was that it would be much harder for any member to ignore international commitments 
made within the framework of any interregional agreement. An excellent example of this 
mutually reinforcing aspect of the internal and external agendas as well as interregionalism’s 
contribution to deeper regionalism was the finalisation of a joint customs code mentioned 
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earlier. Evidently, by 2010, Mercosur members had accepted that the re-launch of EU-
Mercosur trade negotiations would be meaningless without progress on this front.  
A second and opposite view was that Mercosur’s external agenda had over time actually 
added to the strains of integration. This view came across most clearly in the interviews and 
was not well represented in the academic literature. However, it can be inferred from some of 
the more pessimistic and/or cautious accounts of Mercosur survival (Malamud 2005; Gomez-
Mera 2013; Oelsner 2013). Mercosur’s external agenda, it was argued, had forced policy-
makers into tackling issues and formulating common positions before they were ready to do 
so. The insistence of EU trade negotiators that Mercosur further lower tariffs and remove 
other barriers to trade in manufactured goods and services created growing pressure on the 
region’s industrial and service sectors. These sectors had already been hard hit by the market 
reforms of the early 1990s, the economic crises of the late 1990s, and increasing competition 
from China in the 2000s. In addition, the external agenda was also strained at the multi-lateral 
level, where each Mercosur member negotiated on its own behalf.10 Within this highly 
uncertain and competitive environment, the interregional dimension of the external agenda 
seemed to be just one more unwelcome burden where governments found themselves pushing 
reluctant Mercosur businesses and workers to accommodate such demands. Thus, the 
external agenda could be interpreted as Mercosur biting off more than it could chew – it was 
a case of too much too soon. It pushed Mercosur to deepen integration too quickly (if 
successfully completed, it would have meant achieving customs union status in almost half 
the time it took the EU), but ended up with little progress. As Cason pointed out, cases of 
‘vulnerable integration’ like Mercosur were buffeted by events in the international political 
economy, which subjected their regionalism to numerous crises of confidence and 
understandable back-peddling on commitments (Cason 2011) and the need to cyclically re-
boot the deepening process after each crisis (Dabène 2009).   
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The third argument, most clearly stated in Carranza (2006), was that if Mercosur policy-
makers did not take the initiative in working for greater internal consolidation of the bloc, 
then the external agenda was meaningless and simply insufficient for Mercosur survival. In 
other words, the external agenda was not a substitute for facing up to Mercosur’s many 
internal deficits (Blyde, Giordano and Fernandez-Arias 2008; Doctor 2013). The problem 
was exacerbated by Brazil’s foreign policy calculation that Mercosur enlargement rather than 
deepening favoured its strategic objective to gain further recognition as a global power 
(Carranza 2006:809).  
Another point worth highlighting is that in recent years Mercosur governments have pushed 
for a ‘more political’ Mercosur that promoted an ideologically defined social agenda rather 
than focusing on ‘mere market goods’ (Margheritis 2013; Tussie 2009). This agenda 
emphasised political and ideological affinities, highlighted civil society engagement in intra-
regional forums and showed how shared values (often simply related to rejecting neo-
liberalism) created a regional identity and collective sense of solidarity against the hegemonic 
orthodoxies of the 1990s.  
Authors such as Dabène (2009) argue that politicisation does not necessarily mean failure, 
and if politicisation supports achieving regional integration goals, this view would be correct. 
Thus, evaluating the impacts of politicisation necessitate an understanding of the type of 
regionalism Mercosur’s members (state and civil society) actually want. It is hard to get away 
from the impression that there is an element of complacency about the more politically driven 
version of regionalism. Even Uruguayans, who would have much to gain from a more 
market-focused regional production integration and all it entails in terms of trade facilitation, 
investment flows and economies of scale, seem comfortable with a regionalism based on 
ideological affinities and identities rather than on pragmatic economic outcomes.11   
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Thus, my research (interviews, official statements and documents) suggested that it made 
more sense to be pessimistic about the possibility of Mercosur consolidation piggy-backing 
on the attraction of signing a PTA with the EU, not to mention the now dead negotiations for 
the FTAA. Nor does engaging in interregionalism seem to have a balancing aspect for most 
Mercosur members. Rather, research suggested that Mercosur must prioritise its internal 
agenda, if it did not want to remain stuck in a rut. It might need to re-express what regional 
integration should entail for its members, but it cannot afford to continue ignoring the many 
problems of integration. The very survival of the bloc could be jeopardised if Mercosur 
governments and civil society actors do not seriously address the issues arising from the need 
to strengthen institutional capacity, clarify implementation mechanisms under inter-
governmentalism, and eventually integrate markets. It is here that the non-trade pillars of an 
EU association agreement have the most to offer.   
Whatever one’s views on the prospects for interregionalism to support deeper integration in 
Mercosur, evidence suggests that the outcomes are strongly shaped by the almost exclusively 
inter-governmental nature of decision-making and implementation in Mercosur. Although 
dispute settlement tribunals and procedures exist, these are weak and often ignored (e.g. the 
dispute between Argentina and Uruguay about building a pulp mill on the River Uruguay had 
to be taken to the International Court of Justice since no agreement was possible within 
Mercosur frameworks). Arguably, the reluctance to allow any supra-national decision-
making powers is the main shortcoming hampering deeper integration. Mercosur’s pro-inter-
govermentalism position is most strongly stated by Brazil, and hence, understanding its 
position is crucial to evaluating the prospects for regional capacity building.  
On the one hand, Brazil is the key driver of the regional project. On the other hand, its 
reluctance to surrender national sovereignty to regional institutions is one of the main brakes 
on further integration. Gomez-Mera (2013:197) correctly notes how Brazil’s instrumental 
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view of Mercosur contributed to the latter’s endemic weakness. Thus, although Brazil enjoys 
a leading position in Mercosur agenda setting, institution building and influence gaining 
strategies, its insistence on strict inter-governmentalism can be directly blamed for the lack of 
progress. In addition, Mercosur’s other members have been forced to accept Brazil’s strategic 
partnership with the EU, which understandably serves to increase resentment and distrust 
(especially in Argentina). Thus, the EU’s capacity building rhetoric contradicted its more 
globally oriented actions with respect to relations with South American states.  
Ultimately, Mercosur regionalism cannot be deepened without greater trust among its 
members and willingness to yield some amount of national policy-making autonomy. Since 
interregionalism would not solve this problem, it cannot be expected to substitute for supra-
national processes. The incentives, rewards and opportunities on offer via the external agenda 
were simply seen as too meagre to be worth sacrificing national decision-making autonomy. 
The way forward for Mercosur policy-makers and societies would be to re-evaluate the 
internal benefits of regional integration on its own merits. In addition, only emphatic societal 
support for regionalism (and ideally, a growing sense of regional identity) was likely to lead 
politicians to consider yielding some autonomy to help consolidate a lasting regionalism. 
To conclude, one cannot forget that the Mercosur economies suffered a number of severe 
crises in the past two decades. Unsurprisingly, the ever present threat of crisis dissuaded 
policy-makers from ceding autonomy in the first place. More to the point, interregional 
agreements were in no position to protect or guarantee from these threats nor could they offer 
sufficient compensatory gains. Interregionalism was unlikely to serve either as the ‘glue’ or 
as a ‘carrot’ for Mercosur integration.  Much of the evidence suggests that essentially the 
interregional process had at best held off Mercosur’s dissolution, but was not conducive to 
encouraging its consolidation.  
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In effect, my argument is that interregionalism cannot be expected to function efficiently as a 
promoter of regional integration. At best, it can help shape regional calculations (possibly in a 
positive direction, depending on the attractiveness of what is on offer); at worst it can add to 
the strains of the integration process. The EU should not be tempted to weigh in on the side 
of faster and deeper Mercosur integration. Initially the EU used a regional ‘capacity building’ 
agenda to boost its own broader ‘globally active’ type of interregional agenda, but recent 
power and economic shifts in the global economy as well as the euro-zone crisis have 
implicitly altered the EU’s calculations and strategies towards interregionalism. Its use of 
hybrid strategic partnerships involving single counties within a regional bloc is another sign 
of shifting priorities (without calling too much attention to the lower priority given to more 
normative dimensions of EU interregional dialogues). Moreover, the EU has come to 
recognise that it might not accomplish either of the two agendas in the absence of a 
meaningful self-propelled deepening within its regional partners. The pace and direction of 
intra-regional relations and institution building is a choice that should really be left to 
Mercosur governments and societies. Interregionalism cannot compensate for low intra-
regional institutionalisation or ameliorate the impacts of inter-governmentalism or substitute 
for weak political willingness to act to deepen regional integration. 
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ENDNOTES 
1 There are some exceptions, such as J. Gilson, Asia meets Europe: Interregionalism and the 
Asia-Europe Meeting, (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2002).  
2 The author would like to thank all interviewees for their time and insights (some eighteen 
individuals were interviewed in 2008 and 2010). Interviewees included top government 
officials and diplomats/negotiators from the ministries of foreign relations and industry in 
Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay, representatives and directors of the Brazilian National 
Confederation of Industry (CNI), the Argentine Industrial Union (UIA), Brazilian 
Association of Industrial Development (ABDI), Mercosur-European Union Business Forum 
(MEBF), researchers/staff at relevant think-tanks and other business organisations.  
3 While both the EU and Andean Community built in some supranational elements from 
inception of their regionalism projects, it is only the more advanced regionalism (i.e. the EU) 
that developed additional supranational structures and decision-making powers as 
regionalism deepened.  
4 For example, see the various EU-Mercosur Regional Strategy papers.  
5 From a Mercosur integration perspective, the two worst crises were the Brazilian currency 
devaluation in 1999 and the political and economic collapse in Argentina in 2001-2002 with 
its knock-on effects on Uruguay and Paraguay.  
6 The Report makes special note of Mercosur barriers related to government procurement, 
maritime transportation, export of raw materials (agriculture as well as hides for leather), and 
non automatic import licenses.  
7 For example, EU agreements with ACP countries put huge strains on the regional relations 
of states in Africa and the Caribbean. Thus, successful EU agreements are often with single 
countries (e.g. Mexico, not NAFTA; South Africa, not SADC; Chile).  
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8 See the chapters by Andrés Serbin and Marcelo Saguier in Riggirozzi and Tussie (2012) for 
an interesting discussion on related themes and the role of civil society actors.  
9 See Sustainability Impact Assessments for the EU-Mercosur negotiations available on 
http://sia-trade.org/mercosur . The reports discuss economic implications of an agreement on 
various sectors, although less is said about implications for Mercosur institutionalisation.   
10 Note the divergent responses of Brazil and Argentina to the “Lamy package” after the 
WTO ministerial meetings in Geneva in July 2008, as well as Paraguay and Uruguay’s 
disagreement with the position of other developing countries with respect to the special 
safeguard mechanism to protect from import surges of sensitive and special products.  
11 This impression is based on discussions with Uruguayan academics during a brief visit to 
the country in October 2014. I dare say interviews with businesspeople would yield a very 
different picture (as portrayed in the Uruguayan media).  
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